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THE MIRROR NEURON SYSTEM AND
ACTION UNDERSTANDING
Mirror neurons, which have been dis-
covered by single cell recordings in the
parieto-frontal areas of the macaque’s
brain (Rizzolatti et al., 1996), are neu-
rons that discharge in the monkey’s brain
both when a specific action is observed
and when the same action is performed by
the monkey himself. In healthy humans, a
direct measuring of neural activity is not
possible for ethical reasons as the scalp
has to be opened for single cell recordings.
Still, there is broad evidence from indirect
studies that a similar parieto-frontal mir-
ror mechanism also exists in humans (for
an overview see Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia,
2008).
In this opinion paper, we will focus
on the thesis that action understanding
is a function of the mirror neuron
system. We will not address intention
understanding1. According to our opin-
ion, understanding is a process that runs
through hermeneutic circles from the
“Vorverständnis” (“previous understand-
ing”) to steps of deeper understand-
ing, capturing assigned meaning in its
“Bedeutungszusammenhang” (coherence)
and recognizing the historical and cultural
conditionality of understanding (Dilthey,
1961; Gadamer, 1990). In the following,
however, we will focus on the narrow
neuroscientific definition of action under-
standing: the capacity to recognize several
movements as belonging to one action.
Following Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia (2008),
a person “understands” the “action” of a
1For a critical discussion of the function of logically
related mirror neurons see Borg, 2007. For the broken
mirror theory of autism see Cattaneo et al., 2007, for
alternative explanations for the social impairment of
people with autistic spectrum disorder see Southgate
et al., 2009; Frith, 2012.
friend moving her arm to an apple if she
recognizes this movement to be a grasp
toward an apple, if she is able to dis-
tinguish it from other movements and if
she can use this information to organize
appropriate future actions (p. 106). Thus,
saying “The person grasps the apple,” she
understands the action. This definition
equates “understanding” with “recogni-
tion,” explaining why sometimes the lat-
ter term is chosen (Rizzolatti et al., 1996;
Buccino et al., 2004; Iacoboni et al., 2005;
Jacob, 2008).
After a reconstruction of the model’s
developments, we will challenge the claims
of the model by Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia
(2010). By analyzing the relation between
the experimental results and its interpre-
tation, we will conclude that there is no
proof that mirror neuron activity leads to
action understanding.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODELS
LINKING ACTION UNDERSTANDING TO
MIRROR NEURON ACTIVITY
We distinguish between the direct-
matching model, the goal mirroring
model, and the revised goal mirroring
model. This classification is important
because the various critiques of the mod-
els address different basic assumptions
that often are not clearly distinguished
from one another. We base our review of
the model’s developments on an exten-
sive literature research. However, it does
not necessarily reflect the classification the
advocates would have undertaken.
DIRECT-MATCHING MODEL
The direct-matching model was the first
to state that “we understand actions when
we map the visual representation of the
observed action onto our motor represen-
tation of the same action” (Rizzolatti et al.,
2001: 665; Umiltà et al., 2001; Kohler et al.,
2002). Two characteristics of the direct-
matching model have provoked criticism:
First, it explains human action under-
standing through “direct matching” of
observation and execution. Although not
explicitly clarified by the authors, map-
ping the visual representation onto the
motor representation of the same action
can only be achieved by activation of
strictly congruent mirror neurons. The lat-
ter constitutes a subclass of mirror neu-
rons that is only activated if the observed
and the executed motor act are exactly
the same (e.g., grasping with a preci-
sion grip). By contrast, broadly congru-
ent mirror neurons code visual and motor
acts that belong together without being
identical (e.g., grasping with a precision
grip or a whole-hand grip). The activa-
tion of strictly congruent mirror neurons
requires a motor similarity between actor
and observer in order to stimulate the
exact same subclass of mirror neurons. But
as Jacob and Jeannerod (2005) point out,
adults describe the movements of geomet-
ric stimuli in terms of actions as chas-
ing, attacking, comforting, etc. (Heider
and Simmel, 1944). Rhesus monkeys that
cannot throw themselves are nevertheless
able to understand a throwing action by
responding correctly to it (Wood et al.,
2007). Thus, “direct matching” as a motor
simulation cannot be necessary for action
understanding.
Second, the direct-matchingmodel does
not distinguish between action and goal
mirroring. As Csibra (1993) criticizes,
in order to understand an action, one
has to consider that often there are dif-
ferent means to achieve the same goal.
Mirroring can either be a “faithful dupli-
cation of observed actions” without taken
the goal into account, or it can represent
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“high-level action understanding” by mir-
roring the goal of the action without
faithfully duplicating the actions (p. 8).
Thus, action and goal mirroring can-
not be achieved through the same mirror
mechanism.
GOAL MIRRORING MODEL
Discussing the critique of the direct
matching model, Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia
(2010) now link action understanding not
to action, but to goal mirroring: “Through
matching the goal of the observed motor
act with a motor act that has the same
goal, the observer is able to understand
what the agent is doing” (p. 269). Unlike
in the direct-matching model, this model,
that we will call “goal mirroring model,”
focuses on the activity of broadly congru-
ent mirror neurons. By coding visual and
motor acts that belong together without
being identical, broadly congruent mirror
neurons seem to mirror the goal underly-
ing different actions. Ferrari et al. (2005)
discovered tool-responding mirror neu-
rons in the lateral sector of monkey ventral
premotor area F5 that both fire by the
observation of an experimenter grasping
with a tool and by the monkey’s execu-
tion of the same grasping act with its hand
or mouth. Umiltà et al. (2008) showed
that the neuron activity in F5 of two
macaque monkeys did not differ when
the monkeys used normal or reversed
pliers in order to grasp, thus achieving
the same goal via the opposite set of
movements.
However, as Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia
(2010) recognize, action understanding
can occur through different mechanisms,
making goal mirroring not necessary for
action understanding. Humans are able to
understand that a dog is barking although
there is no activation in parietal-frontal
mirror areas (Buccino et al., 2004). As
barking does not belong to the human
motor repertoire, action understanding
cannot exclusively be achieved by mapping
the goal of the observed act onto one’s own
motor repertoire.
GOAL MIRRORING MODEL (REVISED)
As a consequence, Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia
(2010) modify their concept of action
understanding by introducing a gradation
in their definition. The “goal mirroring
model (revised)” differentiates between
the “visual labeling” of an action and
its “understanding from the inside.” The
authors grant that both types qualify as
action understanding, but state that only
an “understanding from the inside” is “a
real understanding”(p. 270).
Labeling unfamiliar motor acts (“bark-
ing,” “saxophone playing” being non
saxophone-experts, see Hickok, 2009) is “a
mere visual experience.” Motor expertise,
that has been shown to elicit stronger mir-
ror neuron activity than non-motor exper-
tise (Calvo-Merino et al., 2005) enables
an “understanding from the inside” and
thus a “real understanding of the com-
municative intent and of what saxophone
playing really means” (p. 270). Thus,
according to this new definition, mir-
ror neuron activity is still conceived as
a necessary condition for “real” action
understanding.
THE ARGUMENTATION IN THE
GOAL-MIRRORING MODEL (REVISED)
All experiments cited above (Umiltà et al.,
2001, 2008; Kohler et al., 2002; Ferrari
et al., 2005) as well as recent experi-
ments (Caggiano et al., 2009, 2012) con-
duct single cell recordings on monkeys
and measure mirror neuron activity. This
activity is interpreted as an indicator
for action understanding. With reference
to previous studies about mirror neu-
ron activity in the human brain, the
results are generalized on humans. The
goal mirroring model (revised) concludes
the primacy of a motor-based action
understanding. The argumentation can be
broken down into the following 4-step
structure:
(1) Result: Mirror neuron activity in the
monkey’s brain is measured.
(2) Previous results: Mirror neuron activ-
ity also exists in the human brain.
(3) Interpretation: Mirror neuron activ-
ity is a proof for action understanding
“from the inside.”
(4) Conclusion: Only through mirror
neuron activity, humans understand
actions “from the inside.”
In the following section, we will present
three points why testing monkey’s mir-
ror neuron activity and making state-
ments about human action understanding
is incorrect.
TAKING MIRROR NEURON ACTIVITY AS A
PROOF FOR ACTION UNDERSTANDING
(INTERPRETATION)
All cited experiments only test the inde-
pendent variable, mirror neuron activity,
by conducting single cell recordings on
monkeys. A valid experiment, however,
must operationalize the independent and
the dependent variable. Variations in the
independent variable, then, are ideally
the causes of variations in the dependent
variable. Instead of operationalizing the
dependent variable, action understanding,
the authors infer from the neural activ-
ity in mirror areas that the monkey has
understood the action.
First, such an inference reduces the
monkey on his brain. This form of brain-
reading is inaccurate because there is no
one-to-one-correspondence between neu-
ral areas and their function in cognitive
processes. As neural plasticity shows, cog-
nitive processes can be associated with
different neural areas. In philosophy of
mind, this issue has been discussed 50
years ago: One of the most influential and
common objections to the identity theory
of mind (which holds that states of the
mind are identical to states of the brain) is
the argument from “multiple realizability”
(Putnam, 1967), criticizing that the same
mental state can be implemented by dif-
ferent physical states (see also Place, 1956;
Smart, 1959; Block and Fodor, 1972).
Second, taking mirror neuron activity
as an indicator for action understanding
is a tautological argumentation: If mirror
neuron activity indicates action under-
standing, then action understanding has
to occur if mirror neuron activity appears.
A tautology is not falsifiable and therefore
disqualifies as a scientific theory (Popper,
1966). This tautology is fortified in the lat-
est version of the goal mirroring model by
Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia (2010). By adding
“fromthe inside” to the term“actionunder-
standing,” the latter is by definition linked
to mirror neuron activity. The motivation
for this appendix remains unclear. In order
to show that its purpose is not only to save
the own theory, it has to be justified.
INFERRING FROMMIRROR NEURON ACTIVITY
IN THE MONKEY’S BRAIN TO HUMAN ACTION
UNDERSTANDING (CONCLUSION)
Even if mirror neuron activity was a proof
for the monkey’s action understanding, it
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would not be justified to make statements
about human action understanding. The
narrow definition of action understanding
already masks the historical and cultural
dimensions of human understanding, but
it does not imply an equalization of mon-
keys’ and human action understanding.
Such equalization is not proven and not
provable: Monkeys cannot be asked about
their understanding in an experimental
test. Thus, the relation between results,
interpretation, and conclusion is method-
ologically incorrect.
STRESSING THE PRIMACY OF A
MOTOR-BASED ACTION UNDERSTANDING
(CONCLUSION)
Suppose equalizing monkeys’ and human
action understanding was justified and
the results on monkeys could there-
fore be generalized on humans. Then
the experimental results would still
not prove the kind of statement that
Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia (2010) make
about human understanding, namely
a gradation between “visual labeling”
and “understanding from the inside.”
It may be intuitively understandable
that a person understands a barking
dog in another manner than a speak-
ing human individual, as well as expert
saxophone players/dancers understand
music/dancing in a different way than
non-experts. But intuitive plausibility
is not a scientific criterion. Following
the definition of the authors (section
The Mirror Neuron System And Action
Understanding), the observer understands
the action as long as he recognizes the
movements as belonging to one action
(“the dog barks,” “the person dances/plays
saxophone”). Musical knowledge or the
communicative content are part of a
broader concept of understanding that
has not been tested experimentally. In
order to test the primacy of a motor-
based action understanding, not only
must understanding be tested (see sec-
tion Taking Mirror Neuron Activity
As A Proof For Action Understanding
(Interpretation)), but the presumed gra-
dation must be tested, too. Changing
definitions in order to account for
incompatible results is not a scientific
act. It is therefore incorrect to con-
clude a primacy of a motor-based action
understanding.
CONCLUSION
In this paper we argue that—contrary
to what is postulated in many articles—
mirror neuron activity is no proof for
action understanding. All cited studies
test monkey’s mirror neuron activity and
make statements about human action
understanding. We discussed three points
why this is incorrect. First, a valid exper-
iment must test both the independent
variable (mirror neuron activity) and the
dependent variable (action understand-
ing). Taking mirror neuron activity as an
indicator for action understanding is a
tautological argumentation and an inac-
curate reduction of the monkey to his
brain. Second, even if mirror neuron activ-
ity was a proof for action understanding
in monkeys, in order to generalize the
results on humans, an equalization of
monkeys’ and human action understand-
ing has to be presumed. Such equalization
is not proven and not provable. Third,
even if mirror neuron activity in mon-
keys was a proof for action understanding
in humans, this would still not prove
the primacy of a motor-based action
understanding. In support of the goal
mirroring model (revised), Rizzolatti
and Sinigaglia (2010) do not present
experimental results, but a modified
yet still tautological definition of action
understanding.
We do not conclude that mirror
neurons cannot have important social
functions. We criticize that the existing
experimental results do not support the
conclusions. They might be intuitively
plausible, but this is not a scientific crite-
rion for a theory to be true. Future stud-
ies should measure understanding if they
make a statement about it. We conclude
that there is no proof that mirror neuron
activity leads to action understanding.
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